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By John C. Mitchell*
Opinion, Expert Testimony Rules
Have Major Impact on State Law
INTRODUCTION
The rules contained in Article VIr, "Opinion and Expert Testi-
mony," of the Proposed Nebraska Rules of Evidence (hereinafter
"Nebraska Rule [s]," "Nebraska proposal" or the "Rule [s]") are for
the most part identical to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
(hereinafter "Federal Rule [s]" or "federal proposal") 701-706. The
impact of these Rules on Nebraska law and practice is, at times,
maj or and such impact is the topic of this article.
RULE 701
Rule 701 is the only rule contained in Article VII which com-
pletely reflects the existing law of Nebraska. It maintains the
position that "if the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testi-
mony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opin-
ions or inferences which are (a) rationally based upon the percep-
tions of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of
his testimony on the determination of a fact in issue."
RULE 702
Rule 702, "Testimony by Experts," may not be significantly dif-
ferent than prior Nebraska law.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in McNaught v. New York Life
Insurance Co.' stated:
Expert testimony is proper and competent concerning matters in-
volving special knowledge, science, or skill upon subjects not
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1. 143 Neb. 220, 12 N.W.2d 108 (1943).
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within the realm of the ordinary experience of jurors, and which
requires special research, experience and study to understand.2
In a later statement, the court in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co.3
commented:
To warrant the use of expert testimony . two elements are re-
quired. First, the subject of the inference must be so distinctively
related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to
be beyond the ken of the average layman, and second, the witness
must have such skill, knowledge or experience in that field or call-
ing as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will prob-
ably aid the trier in his search for truth.4
The Federal Advisory Committee note to Federal Rule 702
stated:
The rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge which
may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and
"technical" but extend to all "specialized" knowledge. Similarly,
the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person quali-
fied by "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education."
The rules stated in the above Nebraska cases seem to limit or
imply limitations as to the type of experts that qualify which
are greater than the limitations set out by Rule 702. The proposed
Rule would eliminate that distinction.
Similarly, the proposed Rule allows an expert witness to testify
if his testimony will "assist" the trier of fact. The McNaught case
restricted testimony to those areas that were "not within the realm
of the ordinary experience of jurors."5  Such a statement could
be construed as saying that an expert cannot testify if his expert
testimony would only "assist" the jurors' understanding. The pro-
posed Rule would do away with such a suggested construction.
The language of Rule 702 meriting the closest consideration is
the statement that a qualified expert witness "may testify ...in
the form of an opinion or otherwise" (emphasis added). The mean-
ing, and therefore the significance, of "or otherwise" is unlimited
and warrants imaginative consideration. It would at least assum-
ably include the use of demonstrative evidence, the conducting of
experiments and the exposition of principles relevant to the issues.
RULE 703
Proposed Rule 703 would have limited impact on present Ne-
braska law. The underlying intent of the rule is probably ex-
2. Id. at 229, 12 N.W.2d at 113.
3. 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
4. Id. at 439, 191 N.W.2d at 608, quoting C. McCoamvcx, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 at 28 (2d ed. 1970).
5. 143 Neb. at 229, 12 N.W.2d at 113.
OPINION TESTIMONY
pressed best by the Federal Advisory Committee's note to Federal
Rule 703. The Committee stated:
Facts or data upon which expert opinions are based may, under
the rule, be derived from three possible sources. The first is the
firsthand observation of the witness, with opinions based thereon
traditionally allowed. A treating physician affords an example.
Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 473,
489 (1962). Whether he must first relate his observations is
treated in Rule 705. The second source, presentation at trial, also
reflects existing practice. The technique may be the familiar hy-
pothetical question or having the expert attend the trial and hear
the testimony establishing the facts. Problems of determining
what testimony the expert relied upon, when the latter technique
is employed and the testimony is in conflict, may be resolved by
resort to Rule 705. The third source contemplated by the rule con-
sists of presentation of data to the expert outside of court and
other than by his own perception. In this respect the rule is de-
signed to broaden the basis for expert opinions beyond that cur-
rent in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into
line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court.
Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on infor-
mation from numerous sources and of considerable variety, includ-
ing statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from
nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays.
Most of them are admissible in evidence, but only with the ex-
penditure of substantial time in producing and examining various
authenticating witnesses. The physician makes life and death de-
cisions in reliance upon them. His validation, expertly performed
and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial pur-
poses. Rheingold, supra, at 531; McCormick, § 15. A similar pro-
vision is California Evidence Code § 801 (b).
The rule also offers a more satisfactory basis for ruling upon
the admissibility of public opinion poll evidence. Attention is di-
rected to the validity of the techniques employed rather than to
relatively fruitless inquiries whether hearsay is involved. See
Judge Feinberg's careful analysis in ZippoI Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Im-
ports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also Blum et
al., The Art of Opinion Research: A Lawyer's Appraisal of an
Emerging Service, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1956); Bonynge, Trade-
mark Surveys and Techniques and Their Use in Litigation, 48
A.B.A.J. 329 (1962); Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence,
45 Cornell L.Q. 322 (1960); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 919.
If it be feared that enlargement of permissible data may tend
to break down the rules of exclusion unduly, notice should be
taken that the rule requires that the facts or data "be of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." The
language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of
an "accidentologist" as to the point of impact in an automobile
collision based on statements of bystanders since this requirement
is not satisfied. See Comment, Cal. Law Rev. Comm'n, Recom-
mendation Proposing an Evidence Code 148-150 (1965).
As the Federal Advisory Committee notes, the third source of
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information for the experts' opinion (that is, data presented to the
expert outside of the courtroom) is the significant change.
Nebraska law will not be substantially affected in that credence
has been given to the principle previously by the Nebraska Su-
preme Court. In Houghton v. Houghton,6 the court held that the
testimony of a doctor as to blood tests was admissible even though
the doctor did not personally perform the test, where the doctor
stated that the blood test was done in a normal procedure by ex-
perienced people working under his direction and the doctor relied
upon their record.
The proposed Rule 703, when accompanied by proposed Rule
702, would seem to greatly magnify the use of an expert in all
types of cases.
RULE 704
Proposed Rule 704 appears on the surface to make a substantial
change in Nebraska law.
In Stillwell v. Schmoker,7 the court stated:
As we said in Danner v. Walters, 154 Neb. 506, 48 N.W.2d 635:
"One of the objections most frequently raised against the admis-
sion of expert opinion testimony is that the opinion offered invades
the province of the jury. This objection is indeed the basis of the
general rule of evidence that the testimony of witnesses must be
confined to concrete facts perceived by the use of their senses as
distinguished from opinions and conclusions deducible from evi-
dentiary facts. In many cases it is asserted as a broad general
rule, often assumed to be an inflexible rule of law, that while an
expert may be permitted to express his opinion, or even his belief,
he cannot give his opinion upon the precise or ultimate fact in
issue before the jury, which must be determined by it. See, 20
Am. Jur., Evidence, § 782, p. 653, and cases cited under note 16
thereof; Neal v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 98 Neb. 460, 153 N.W. 492;
Gross v. Omaha & C.B. Street Ry. Co., 96 Neb. 390, 147 N.W. 1121,
L.R.A. 1915A 742.8
The change in Nebraska law is limited, however, in that the
general rule expressed by the court in Stillwell has not been con-
sidered an invariable one.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Petracek v. Haas O.K. Rubber
Welders, Inc.9 stated the following with reference to the "general
rule":
6. 179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d 861 (1965).
7. 175 Neb. 595, 122 N.W.2d 538 (1963).
8. Id. at 599-600, 122 N.W.2d at 541.
9. 176 Neb. 438, 126 N.W.2d 466 (1964).
OPINION TESTIMONY
This however is not an invariable rule. In McNaught v. New
York Life Ins. Co., on motion for rehearing, 143 Neb. 220, 12 N.W.
2d 108, a departure is contained. It is there stated: "It is not
a valid objection to the evidence of an expert that the answer cov-
ers the whole ground the jury are to decide, if the case is one
to be wholly resolved by such evidence." See, also, Medelman
v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 518, 52 N.W.2d 328;
Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151.10
It has always been recognized in Nebraska that under ordinary
circumstances, expert opinion evidence is to be considered and
weighed by triers of fact like any other testimony.'1 If the jury
is capable of performing its duties, it seems consistent to allow
expert testimony as to the ultimate issue also.
RULE 705
Proposed Rule 705 would allow an expert to "testify in terms
of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the judge requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
The Rule thus gives value to the experts' opinion based on the
foundation that has been laid as to his expertise. The burden lies
on the cross-examiner to discover the underlying facts or data and
the negate or mitigate the probative value of the opinion.
In its comment to Federal Rule 705, the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee noted:
The hypothetical question has been the target of a great deal
of criticism as encouraging partisan bias, affording an opportunity
for summing up in the middle of the case, and as complex and
time consuming. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414,
426-527 (1952). While the rule allows counsel to make disclosure
of the underlying facts or data as a preliminary to the giving of
an expert opinion, if he chooses, the instances in which he is re-
quired to do so are reduced. This is true whether the expert bases
his opinion on data furnished him at secondhand or observed by
him at firsthand.
The elimination of the requirement of preliminary disclosure
at the trial of underlying facts or data has a long background of
support. In 1937 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in-
corporated a provision to this effect in their Model Expert Testi-
mony Act, which furnished the basis for Uniform Rules 57 and
58, Rule 4515, N.Y. CPLR (McKinney 1963) provides:
10. Id. at 446, 126 N.W.2d at 470.
11. Lansman v. Department of Rds., 177 Neb. 119, 128 N.W.2d 569 (1964);
Department of Rds. v. Dillon, 175 Neb. 444, 122 N.W.2d 223 (1963);
In re Dunbier's Estate, 170 Neb. 541, 103 N.W.2d 797 (1960).
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"Unless the court orders otherwise, questions calling for the
opinion of an expert witness need not be hypothetical in
form, and the witness may state his opinion and reasons
without first specifying the data upon which it is based.
Upon cross-examination, he may be required to specify the
data ......
See also California Evidence Code, section 802; Kansas Code of
Civil Procedure, §§ 60-456, 60-457; New Jersey Evidence Rules
57, 58.
If the objection is made that leaving it to the cross-examiner
to bring out the supporting data is essentially unfair, the answer
is that he is under no compulsion to bring out any facts or data
except those unfavorable to the opinion. The answer assumes that
the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential
for effective cross-examination. This advance knowledge has been
afforded, though, imperfectly, by the traditional foundation re-
quirement. Rule 26 (b) (4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as re-
vised, provides for substantial discovery in this area, obviating in
large measure the obstacles which have been raised in some in-
stances to discovery of findings, underlying data, and even the
identity of the experts. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Ad-
verse Party's Expert Information, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 455 (1962).
These safeguards are reinforced by the discretionary power of the
judge to require preliminary disclosure in any event.
Reference should be made to section 25-12,117 of Nebraska's
Uniform Composite Reports as Evidence Act.12 The statutes therein
provide and require that notice be given if a written report cov-
ered by the Act is to be used in trial and that the report be fur-
nished to the adverse party or at least be made available for his
use.
RULE 706
Proposed Rule 706, as to court appointed experts, would express
specific provisions in this area which, for the most part, have not
been considered by Nebraska statutes13 or case law.
Subsection (a) requires the parties to make application while
allowing the judge to move on his own accord when he feels the
necessity exists. It contains the fairness of allowing the parties
to show cause why an expert should not be appointed while plac-
ing the final decision with the trial judge.
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-12,117 (Reissue 1943).
13. But see Nzs. REv. STAT. §§ 29-1804.11 (authorizing the county board
to fix compensation for, inter alia, expenses for experts necessary for
the public defender to represent his clients), 29-1804.12 (authorizing
appointed counsel representing an indigent felony defendant to apply
for reasonable expenses), 29-1920 (taxing reasonable costs of indigent
defendants against the prosecuting authority).
OPINION TESTIMONY
Subsection (b) of the proposed Rule deletes from the language
of Federal Rule 706 any reference to cases involving just compen-
sation under the fifth amendment for obvious reasons. The Ne-
braska Rule also varies from the Federal Rule in that the Nebraska
"Rule provides that compensation for a court-appointed witness be
provided by the parties in equal portions in all civil cases rather
than in "such proportions . . . as the judge directs." The source
of compensation in criminal cases remains the same as that stated
in the Federal Rule.
Subsection (b) further provides that an expert is entitled to
"reasonable compensation." As to what measure should be used,
various criminal cases provide that the judge determine the
amount of compensation by use of the standard set out in United
States v. Pope.14 It was there held that the rate of compensation
for defendant's witness be determined by the fair and reasonable
charge in the locality in which the services were rendered and tes-
timony given. Various Nebraska civil cases 15 exist to the effect
that a witness who testifies as an expert on a subject requiring spe-
cial knowledge and skill is, in the absence of special contract, en-
titled only to the statutory fee.'
In Hefti v. Hefti 7 it was stated:
"There is . . .no provision in the law for the payment of expert
witness fees. The expert witnesses are therefore allowed the usual
and lawful witness fee, and no more. Main v. Sherman County,
74 Neb. 155." In that connection, only the usual and lawful wit-
ness fee for the physician involved should be assessed as costs
herein, as provided by section 33-139, R.R.S. 1943.18
It seems unrealistic to limit the compensation paid to experts
to the statutory fee paid to ordinary witnesses. A reasonable and
ordinary fee determined by the judge seems to be the logical an-
swer.
The standard used in United States v. Pope 19 is suggested as
an appropriate means to measure the rate of compensation in all
cases.
Subsections (c) and (d) of the propsed Rule 706 cover areas
14. 251 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1966).
15. Anderson v. Department of Rds., 184 Neb. 467, 168 N.W.2d 522 (1969);
Hefti v. Hefti, 166 Neb. 181, 88 N.W.2d 231 (1958).
16. NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 33-139 (Reissue 1968).
17. 166 Neb. 181, 88 N.W.2d 231 (1958).
18. Id. at 183, 88 N.W.2d at 233, quoting Ulaski v. Morris & Co., 106 Neb.
782, 786, 184 N.W. 946, 947 (1921).
19. 251 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1966).
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on which past Nebraska cases have been silent. Said sections pro-
vide as follows:
(c) Disclosure of Appointment. In the exercise of his discretion,
the judge may authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that
the court appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' Experts of Own Selection. Nothing in this rule lim-
its the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
